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Quid Pro Quo:  To what extent can states implement efficiency 
standards on individual water rights under the prior 
appropriation doctrine? 
 
    Under the prior appropriations doctrine, water can be transferred.  Marketing 
water from inefficient uses to municipal or other uses which put water to a higher 
economic benefit has been viewed in academics as a way of improving utilization 
of the resource.  Additionally, transferring water to municipalities has been 
viewed as the panacea for the West, as markets potentially can reallocate water.  
Despite their best efforts to purchase water, most western cities have been 
unable to obtain adequate water for their future needs.  Simply stated, 
municipalities need other uses to sell them water or water rights.  One proposal 
for facilitating a transfer of water or water rights is to redefine waste under the 
doctrine of prior appropriations.  Such an initiative would eliminate inefficient 
uses and/or practices.  Subsequently, water previously used for these purposes 
may become available on the open market.     
    Can rules eliminating uses previously accepted as beneficial be implemented 
after a water right has been perfected?  What extent can efficiency standards be 
imposed on an existing water right?  When, if ever would either of these 
circumstances invoke the takings clause?   
     This work will attempt to address these issues in a case study involving 
California. 
